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QUESTION PRESENTED
This brief addresses the following question:
Whether Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,
431 U.S. 209 (1977), should be overruled, and public
sector agency shop arrangements invalidated, under
the First Amendment.
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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
Amici curiae are the professors listed in
Appendix A, each of whom has expertise relevant to
the issues before the Court in this case. Amici are
interested in the outcome of this case because it
raises important questions about the extent of this
Court’s traditional deference to states acting as
employers; specifically, whether one time-tested
method of public workforce management—collective
bargaining with an elected union that represents
members and non-members alike and is in turn
supported by an agency fee—will be held
unconstitutional.
A list of signatories can be found at Appendix A,
with
institutional
affiliations
provided
for
identification purposes only.

No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part,
and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended
to fund the preparation of this brief. No person other than the
amici curiae or their counsel made a monetary contribution to
the preparation or submission of this brief. Letters evidencing
the parties’ consent to the filing of amicus briefs are on file with
the clerk.
1
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As employers that must manage large and
diverse workforces and deliver critical public
services,
states
and
municipalities
require
substantial deference to their managerial choices. In
addition, federalism principles weigh in favor of
federal courts’ deference to state employers. Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), is
simply one manifestation of these longstanding
principles.
I. Most public employers manage at least
some of their employees by allowing them to elect a
union representative to bargain collectively over
terms and conditions of employment. Many of these
employers also permit elected unions to charge a
representation or “agency” fee from each worker to
whom the union owes a duty of fair representation.
The agency fee ensures that the union has the
resources necessary to perform core tasks related to
representation; without it, workers may engage in
economically rational “free riding,” which can
increase fractiousness among employees, damage
morale, and leave unions unable to perform key
functions.
Collective bargaining has proven benefits for
public employers—including preventing strikes and
other labor disruptions, and improving the delivery
of public services—because it provides a productive
channel for workers to be heard and to resolve their
differences with management. Thus, it is not
surprising that a few public employers began
bargaining with their employees’ chosen union
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representatives even before they were required to by
law. Later, public sector labor relations law caught
up with practice as states sought to prevent public
employee strikes, and to recruit and retain highquality employees. Indeed, empirical evidence shows
fewer strikes where public employers have a duty to
bargain
with
employees’
elected
union
representatives. In addition, collective bargaining is
linked to a host of related workplace benefits,
including reduced employee turnover, increased job
satisfaction, and improved worker productivity.
These benefits run to both employers and employees,
and they explain how collective bargaining can raise
worker pay without contributing significantly to
increased public budgets.
Many states have also concluded that unions
are better able to perform their roles where they
have adequate funds, and are funded in a fair way. A
mandatory agency fee achieves both of these goals by
requiring each represented worker to contribute to
the costs of core union representational activities.
Basic economics predicts that free riding is
inevitable where workers receive the benefits of
union representation whether or not they contribute
toward its costs. And research shows both that free
riding is common where workers are not required to
pay an agency fee, and that it has a deleterious effect
on unions’ abilities to represent workers. These
negative effects will redound to public employers, as
under-resourced unions are less likely to achieve the
stability- and productivity-enhancing benefits
described above.
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II. This Court’s First Amendment case law
has consistently afforded public employers the
flexibility to manage their employees to best deliver
public services. In particular, this Court has long
permitted governments acting in their managerial
capacities (rather than as sovereign) significant
leeway to limit employees’ speech in the interest of
workplace efficiency. Moreover, that is true even
when the employee speech at issue is on a matter of
public concern, and even when it takes place outside
of working hours. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618
(2014), is not to the contrary, because that case did
not involve public employees; by definition, the
government could not have been acting in its public
employer capacity.
In light of that longstanding principle, the key
inquiry in this case should be whether governments
adopt agency fee policies in their employer
capacities. Given the workforce management
benefits of collective bargaining described above, it is
plain that they do. Accordingly, Abood is consistent
with this Court’s general approach to public
employees’ First Amendment rights and should not
be overturned.
ARGUMENT
States and localities bear responsibility for
providing critical government services, including law
enforcement, education, sanitation, and fire and
disaster protection. See Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 575
(1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (those services
“epitomize the concerns of local, democratic self-
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government”); Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Today, education is perhaps
the most important function of state and local
governments.”). These duties are carried out by
public workers and managed by public officials.
Control over how to manage this critical
relationship is at the heart of this case. Petitioners
ask this Court to remove from public employers one
proven method of managing their workforces:
collective bargaining with an elected union, whose
core functions are funded through mandatory agency
fees. Their argument is inconsistent with this
Court’s longstanding practice of deferring to public
employers when they act in their managerial
capacity to ensure the efficient delivery of public
services, including limiting public employees’ speech
and association.
I. Many States Improve Their Delivery of
Public
Services
Through
Collective
Bargaining With Elected Unions That Are In
Turn Supported By Agency Fees.
Most states have chosen to manage their
public employees in part by allowing them to bargain
collectively
over
terms
and
conditions
of
employment. These states and municipalities have
reasonably concluded that collective bargaining is a
sensible and fair way to respond to employees’
concerns and desires, and this conclusion is
supported by research showing that public sector
bargaining tends to reduce strikes and improve the
delivery of public services.
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In addition, states may decide whether or not
to permit unions to charge represented workers an
agency fee, and many states have concluded that the
benefits of collective bargaining are best achieved
when each represented employee contributes to his
or her union’s core representation expenses. In short,
agency fees are an equitable way of ensuring that
elected union representatives have the funding they
need to represent every member of the bargaining
unit. The alternative risks a situation in which too
many employees make the economically rational
decision to “free ride” while still receiving the
benefits of union representation, leaving the union
unable to effectively represent the workers who
elected it. This outcome could lead to labor unrest
and the loss of the public benefits that employers can
achieve through collective bargaining.
This Section first explains the benefits to
states of public sector collective bargaining, and then
addresses the role that agency fees play in achieving
those goals.
A. Collective Bargaining is a Time-Tested
Method of Managing Public Workforces,
Avoiding Workplace Disruption, and
Improving Delivery of Public Services.
In addition to making substantive human
resources decisions about whom to hire or fire or how
much to pay, state and local governments must
decide how to manage the large numbers of workers
they employ. Unlike private employers, however,
our federalist structure also allows states to dictate
the laws that govern their internal labor-
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management
relationships.
States
frequently
exercise this freedom in light of their evolving views
of how to achieve the best outcomes, with most
states allowing at least some public employees to
bargain collectively. Joseph Slater, The Strangely
Unsettled State of Public-Sector Labor in the Past
Thirty Years, 30 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 511, 51213 (2013) (noting that as of 2007, all but seven states
had some provision for public sector bargaining).
Accordingly, states’ public sector labor relations
regimes reflect a range of decisions on issues such as
which employees (if any) may elect a bargaining
representative, how to resolve bargaining impasses,
whether (and which) public employees may strike,
how to process employee grievances, and which
working conditions are subject to bargaining. See id.
at 512-13; Ann C. Hodges, Lessons from the
Laboratory: The Polar Opposites on the Public Labor
Law Spectrum, 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 735
(2009) (comparing Virginia, which has outlawed
public sector collective bargaining, with Illinois,
which has adopted robust collective bargaining).
Whereas some of petitioners’ amici suggest
that public sector collective bargaining is harmful to
the public interest, and attribute its existence to
misaligned political incentives, 2 both history and
empirical research demonstrate important employer
and public benefits of public sector collective
E.g., Br. Amicus Curiae of Pac. Legal Found., et al., at 9-13.
In contrast to the picture painted by some of petitioners’ amici,
employee organizations (and later unions) have served as an
“important wedge between political party machines and public
employees.” William Herbert, Card Check Labor Certification:
Lessons From New York, 74 Alb. L. Rev. 93, 101 (2010-11).
2
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bargaining. First, states’ experiences over the last
several decades show the value of collective
bargaining in delivering public services; indeed,
many public employers began bargaining with
employee unions in order to ensure efficient and
uninterrupted service even before they adopted state
laws to facilitate bargaining. Second, research
confirms that collective bargaining effectively
resolves differences between employees and
management, helping minimize potential discord
and disruption, and decreasing the likelihood of
strikes. Third, collective bargaining improves
workers’ longevity and productivity, and yields other
positive employment and service-delivery outcomes.
Fourth, collective bargaining does not drain the
public fisc; while workers represented by public
sector unions tend to receive higher pay than their
non-union counterparts, those pay increases are
offset by other efficiencies.
1. The utility of public sector bargaining for
public employers is illustrated by its use long before
the first state public-sector bargaining statute was
passed in 1959. Joseph Slater, Public Workers:
Government Employee Unions, the Law, and The
State, 1900-62 158 (2004). Beginning in the early
1900s, postal clerks, teachers, firefighters, and other
public sector workers began to unionize, such that
the number of unionized public sector workers
nearly doubled from 1915 to 1921, and overall union
density in the public sector increased from 4.8
percent to 7.2 percent. Id. at 18.
Some public employers responded by
bargaining with labor unions, and the resulting
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agreements took various forms—some were written,
others were oral, and still others were written
policies that were officially unilateral statements by
the employer but in fact were forged with union
input. For example, in 1934, Operating Engineers
Local 142 negotiated a written agreement with the
Chicago Board of Education that the Board followed.
Id. at 124. The next year, the New York Emergency
Relief Bureau “negotiated a grievance procedure
with its unionized employees.” The result was signed
by both sides, but later “changed to a unilateral
announcement” after city officials “questioned the
legality of a bilateral agreement.” Id. Federal
entities negotiated with employees as well, notably
in the Tennessee Valley Authority (written
agreements that were formally unilateral but were
produced through negotiation) and the U.S. Post
Office (oral agreements that the Post Office
followed). Id.
By the late 1950s, increasing acceptance of
public sector unions, and the growing disparity
between law and practice, led states and the federal
government to begin to authorize public-sector
bargaining. Id. at 158-59, 190. By 1966, sixteen
states had enacted laws granting at least some
organizing and bargaining right to public employees,
and by the end of the 1970s, a majority of states had
adopted such laws. Id. at 191; Seth Harris, Joseph
Slater, Anne Lofaso & David Gregory, Modern Labor
Law in the Private and Public Sectors: Cases and
Materials 63 (2013).
Legislative materials associated with many
early public sector collective bargaining laws reveal
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that these laws were aimed at achieving multiple
public goals, including stemming a tide of public
employee strikes in the 1960s and 1970s, 3 and
recruiting and retaining high-quality employees who
would efficiently deliver public services. See, e.g.,
Michigan Panel Report on Public Employee
Bargaining (Feb. 28, 1967) (describing “basic
objective[]” of “protecting the general public against
interruptions or impairment of essential government
services”); Pennsylvania Governor’s Commission to
Revise the Public Employment Law 7 (1968) (absence
of collective bargaining rights “reduces the value of
[government employment] to that employe [sic]”);
Rhode Island’s Commission to Study Mediation and
Arbitration 2 (1966) (“To achieve high quality
education, good relations between teaching
personnel and school boards are indispensable.”);
Ohio Legislative Service Commission, Public
Employee Labor Relations 2 (1969) (“the employee’s
efficiency and contribution to the service generally
increases if he participates in the decisions”); New
York, Governor’s Committee on Public Employee
Relations Final Report 9 (1966) (“protection of the
public from strikes in public services requires the
designation of other ways and means for dealing
with claims of public employees for equitable
treatment”).
2. Consistent with these states’ early findings,
research shows that collective bargaining provides a
productive channel for employees to resolve
US Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Work
Stoppages in Government, 1979 4 (1981), available at
http://bit.ly/1laOKzG.
3
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differences with their public employers without
resorting to strikes or other disruptive conflict. By
facilitating employees’ input into the terms and
conditions of their work, union representation—
including contract negotiation, grievance processes,
and impasse procedures—prevents or mitigates
employee dissatisfaction before it reaches a
disruptive level. Moreover, the creation of structured
channels for communication can help management
and employees to understand each other’s
perspectives and enable ongoing, low-level problem
solving.
Accordingly, one study of state and local
government workers over a fifteen-year period found
that “[s]trike incidence is highest when the parties
have neither a duty to bargain nor disputeresolution procedures.” Janet Currie & Sheena
McConnell, The Impact of Collective-Bargaining
Legislation on Disputes in the U.S. Public Sector: No
Legislation May Be the Worst Legislation, 37 J.L. &
Econ. 519, 532 (1994). Numerous other researchers
confirm this conclusion. 4 The Currie & McConnell
study also concluded that “[s]trike incidence can be
E.g., James L. Stern & Craig Olson, The Propensity to Strike
of Public Employees, 11 J. Collective Negotiations 201 (1982);
David Lewin et al., Getting It Right: Empirical Evidence and
Policy Implications from Research on Public-Sector Unionism
and Collective Bargaining 2, 13–14 (2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1792942; Martin H. Malin, Public
Employees’ Right to Strike: Law and Experience, 26 U. Mich.
J.L. Ref. 313, 361-65 (1993) (finding significantly fewer public
sector strikes occurred in Ohio and Illinois after those states
passed collective bargaining statutes); Richard C. Kearney &
Patrice M. Mareschal, Labor Relations in the Public Sector 24748 (5th ed. 2014) (reviewing studies).
4
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reduced by switching to a regime in which employers
are required to bargain in good faith and strikes are
illegal.” Id. at 544.
Given its effectiveness in reducing conflict, it
is unsurprising that most states and localities have
adopted collective bargaining for at least some
employees. Even states that generally eschew public
sector
bargaining
sometimes
permit
union
representation and collective bargaining for public
safety employees, where service interruptions due to
strikes would be singularly costly or dangerous.
Thus, nearly all states permit bargaining by
professional firefighters, including some that
authorize no or nearly no other bargaining. Richard
Kearney, Labor Relations in the Public Sector 62-64
(4th ed. 2009); see also Malin, Public Employees’
Right to Strike, at 316 n.13 (listing states that
permit collective bargaining only within certain
employee units, including first responders). More
starkly, when Wisconsin’s legislature significantly
curtailed collective bargaining for most public sector
workers, it left intact bargaining rights (including
permitting agency fees) for public safety workers,
citing the dangers of strikes by those workers.5 Wisc.
Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 824 F. Supp. 2d 856,
865 (W.D. Wisc. 2012), rev’d in part, 705 F.3d 640
(7th Cir. 2013); see also Casey Ichniowski, Collective
Bargaining & Compulsory Arbitration: Prescriptions
for the Blue Flu, 21 Indus. Rel. 149 (1982) (finding
that “municipalities in states that provide for
Subsequently, Wisconsin barred agency fees in the private
sector, Wis. Stat., § 111.04(3) (2015), but that legislation did
not affect the legality of agency fees for public safety unions.
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collective bargaining in any form experience
significantly fewer police strikes than do
municipalities in environments where there is no
law or where police bargaining is specifically
outlawed”).
3. In addition to averting workplace
disruption, collective bargaining yields affirmative
benefits for public employers, including improved
workplace efficiency and reduced employee turnover.
A large body of evidence shows that collective
bargaining benefits employers in two key ways.
First, the chance to have a voice at work through
collective bargaining is itself highly valued by
employees, who report that they view bargaining
both as a way to improve their own lives and to
make their employers more successful. Richard B.
Freeman & Joel Rogers, What Workers Want 4-5
(1999). Second, workers who have a say in workplace
decisions are “more likely to buy into the firm’s
processes and objectives,” yielding higher “job
satisfaction, loyalty, and job tenure” and “reduc[ing]
the costs associated with the hiring and training of
new employees and provides an incentive for
investment in enterprise-specific skills.” Stephen F.
Befort, A New Voice for the Workplace: A Proposal
For An American Works Councils Act, 69 Mo. L. Rev.
607, 611-12 (2004); see also Samuel Estreicher, “Easy
In, Easy Out”: A Future for U.S. Workplace
Representation, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 1615, 1620 (2014)
(“collective bargaining provides a means for workers
to collectively express their preference for [a
particular workplace policy] and for parties to
determine whether the collective benefits outweigh
the collective costs of its provision”); Kenneth G.
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Dau-Schmidt & Arthur R. Traynor, Regulating
Unions and Collective Bargaining, in Labor and
Employment Law and Economics 96, 109 (Kenneth
G. Dau-Schmidt et al. eds., 2009) (collective
bargaining helps employees to feel more useful and
engaged, and has been linked to productivity gains,
including lower turnover, search, and retraining
costs).
Empirical studies find that where mature
collective bargaining relationships develop, “unions
can increase firm productivity in certain industries,
particularly if management constructively embraces,
rather than fights, union contributions.”
DauSchmidt & Traynor at 109-10; see also Richard B.
Freeman & James L. Medoff, What Do Unions Do?
19 (1985) (“unions are associated with greater
efficiency in most settings”). Other research suggests
that this finding also holds in the public sector. For
example, one study linked teachers unions to
stronger statewide performance on standardized
college entrance exams. Robert Carini, Brian Powell
& Lala Carr Steelman, Do Teacher Unions Hinder
Educational Performance? Lessons Learned From
State SAT & ACT Scores, 70 Harv. Educ. Rev. 437
(2000). Other studies have reached similar findings.6
F. Howard Nelson, Michael Rosen & Brian Powell, Are
Teachers’ Unions Hurting American Education? A State-ByState Analysis Of The Impact Of Collective Bargaining Among
Teachers on Student Performance 4 (1996) (“The results of this
study demonstrate clearly that student performance on [SAT
College Entrance exams and the National Assessment of
Educational Progress fourth grade reading test] is significantly
better in states with high levels of unionization with all other
variables held constant.”); Morris M. Kleiner & Daniel L.

6
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The explanation for these productivity gains
in unionized school districts likely has many causes,
but one is straightforward:
[I]t would be silly to try to plan school
policies or curricula without consulting
with the teachers who have been
trained to educate children and who are
actually involved in the day-to-day
Petree, Unionism and Licensing of Public School Teachers:
Impact on Wages & Educational Output, in When Public Sector
Workers Unionize 306 (Richard B. Freeman & Casey
Ichniowski eds., 1988) (“collective bargaining coverage is
associated with . . . higher educational performance as
measured by student test scores and high graduation rates”);
Randall W. Eberts & Joe A. Stone, Teacher Unions & the
Productivity of Public Schools, 40 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 354,
354 (1987) (“[h]olding resources constant and using
achievement gains on standardized tests as the measure of
output, . . . union [school] districts are seven percent more
productive for average students,” and three percent more
productive across all students). To be sure, there is variation in
the literature on the effect of teachers unions on school district
productivity, which may be in part a function of which states
are investigated. Compare Michael F. Lovenheim, Stanford
Institute for Economic Policy Research, The Effect of Teachers’
Unions on Education Production: Evidence From Union
Election Certifications in Three Midwestern States (March
2009), http://bit.ly/1WVvGBn (“teachers’ unions have no impact
on teacher pay or per-student district expenditures . . . class
sizes. . . . [or] high school dropout rates”) with Benjamin A.
Lindy, The Impact of Teacher Collective Bargaining Laws on
Student Achievement: Evidence From a New Mexico Natural
Experiment, 120 Yale L.J. 1130, 1169 (2011) (study of effect of
teachers unions in New Mexico, finding that “mandatory
collective bargaining laws in the public school context lead to
an increase in SAT scores and a decrease in graduation rates”).
This variation underscores the importance of permitting state
experimentation with a range of workplace-relations models.
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running of the schools. Discussions with
collective representatives in a union
setting are more likely to be productive
than individual discussions because
employees will have less fear of
retaliation for reporting administrative
failures.
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Mohammad Khan,
Undermining
or
Promoting
Democratic
Government?: An Economic and Empirical Analysis
of the Two Views of Public Sector Collective
Bargaining in American Labor Law, 14 Nev. L.J.
414, 429 (2014) (productivity gains can be attributed
to facts that “unions help promote the negotiation of
efficient contract terms,” ensure that those terms are
enforced, and facilitate worker voice, which lowers
costly employee turnover).
In addition to workforce management
benefits, some states and municipalities have
worked to achieve other public policy goals through
collaborative labor-management relationships. For
example, some school districts (including in
California) have been remarkably successful in
partnering
with
their
employees’
collective
bargaining representatives to improve student
performance and teacher quality. Ken Futernick et
al., Labor-Management Collaboration in Education:
The Process, The Impact, & The Prospects For
Change 25 (Janice L. Agee ed., 2013) (“[t]he most
common
practice
in
high-[labor-management
cooperation] districts was a consistent, shared focus
on the quality of education provided to the district’s
students[,]” and citing examples including Green Dot
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Public
Schools
in
Los
Angeles,
where
“administrators and union representatives explicitly
prioritize student interests as they negotiate
contracts”); Saul A. Rubinstein & John E. McCarthy,
Collaborating on School Reform: Creating UnionManagement Partnerships to Improve Public School
Systems 8-12 (2010) (describing case studies,
including union-management collaboration within
California’s ABC School District on topics including
peer mentoring and evaluation, new teacher
orientation, and use of data-based decision making
on student performance); Bobbi C. Houtchens et al.,
Local Labor Management Relationships as a Vehicle
to Advance Reform: Findings From the U.S.
Department of Education Labor Management
Conference, 4 (2011) (describing case studies in
which
labor-management
partnerships
have
contributed to improved student outcomes in a range
of areas by facilitating “teacher leadership,” which is
“essential to dynamic decision-making”).
Among these success stories are school
districts such as Toledo, OH, where teachers unions
have worked with districts to develop rigorous yet
fair teacher evaluation and development systems,
thereby improving teacher buy-in to what is often a
tremendously divisive issue. U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
Shared Responsibility: A U.S. Department of
Education White Paper on Labor-Management
Collaboration 11-12 (2012) (describing unionmanagement Board of Review in Ohio, which has
“provide[d] more rigorous evaluations than those
conducted by principals in the past”). Similarly, in
Massachusetts, “interest based” rather than
adversarial collective bargaining resulted in both
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school and union leadership becoming more likely to
view collective bargaining as a “vehicle[] for
improving student performance,” and also facilitated
a collaborative process that resulted in improved
teacher leadership, dual language immersion
education, improved professional development, and
other improvements at districts serving large
numbers of low-income, minority, and special
education students. Thomas A. Kochan et al.,
Massachusetts Education Partnership: Results &
Research From the First Two Years (2015).
Similar examples abound, and are not limited
to
education.
In
Ohio,
labor-management
cooperation led to “millions of dollars in savings”
across state government, with former Governor
George Voinovich observing that “[m]y feeling is that
labor is key” to successful quality management
efforts. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Report of the U.S.
Secretary of Labor’s Task Force on Excellence in
State & Local Government Through LaborManagement Cooperation (1996), available at
http://1.usa.gov/1klt2bG. In Massachusetts, a joint
venture between labor unions and MassHighway
resulted in a sixty percent reduction in workers
compensation claims, significant reductions in
overtime and sick time, and millions in savings. Id.,
available at http://1.usa.gov/1ix3J5e. Significantly,
in each of these examples, as in the public education
examples described in the previous paragraph, the
collective representative played a key role in
marshaling employee support for the joint initiative,
on one hand, and channeling employee feedback, on
the other. Given the importance of employee buy-in
to the success of these new initiatives, each would
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have been more difficult in an employment setting
that lacked employee representation.
4. Finally, public sector bargaining has been
shown to have little effect on overall budgets; even
within program budgets, the effects of bargaining on
allocation are generally modest and offset by
efficiency gains. “The research on public
expenditures . . . confirms that there are few if any
public shifts in expenditures attributable to
collective bargaining.” Jeffrey H. Keefe, A
Reconsideration and Empirical Evaluation of
Wellington’s & Winter’s, The Unions And the Cities,
34 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 251, 272-73 (2013)
(citing studies). Further, while public sector
collective bargaining “has resulted in higher public
employee wages in the range of 5% to 8%” over
wages in states without bargaining, id. at 272,
several caveats apply. First, bargaining can help
offset employer monopsony power in the public
sector, mitigating the wage penalty many public
sector employees experience relative to comparable
private sector employees. Id. 7 Second, wage
increases may be offset by productivity gains, as
described above. Third, the lowest-skilled (and
lowest paid) public sector workers tend to receive the
Public employer monopsony power can depress public sector
workers’ wages, especially for highly skilled or professional
employees. Joseph Slater & Elijah Welenc, Are Public-Sector
Employees “Overpaid” Relative to Private-Sector Employees? An
Overview of the Studies, 52 Washburn L.J. 533, 534 (2013)
(stating that “a majority of studies have found that public
workers overall are paid somewhat less than comparable
private-sector employees,” though workers at the bottom of the
pay scale are somewhat better off in the public sector, and
workers at the top of the pay scale are worse off).
7
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greatest
wage
increases
associated
with
unionization; as many states turn their attention to
the problem of income inequality, raising the wages
of these workers may reflect public policy choices as
much as union pressure. Lewin, Getting it Right at 6
(“[m]ore highly educated employees . . . enjoy less of
a union premium than their less educated
counterparts, which also contributes to lower []
income inequality and helps to keep the overall costs
of collective bargaining to employers in check”).
In the public sector, labor relations are not
simply a matter of employee choice. Rather, states
have shaped their collective bargaining laws and
policies to facilitate effective employee relations.
B. Mandatory Agency Fees Are a Fair Way
to Ensure Unions Have the Resources
Necessary Carry Out Their Statutory
Mandates and to Achieve the Public
Benefits of Collective Bargaining.
There are two primary (and related) reasons
that states that have adopted collective bargaining
as a method of workforce management may choose to
require or permit agency fees. First, agency fees
distribute the costs of representation equally among
all who are represented by an elected union; and
second, agency fees ensure unions have sufficient
resources for states to achieve the benefits of
collective bargaining.
1. Virtually all states and municipalities that
bargain collectively with their employees do so only
with elected unions that represent all of the
employees in a bargaining unit, and agency fees are
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a fair way of distributing the costs of that
representation. As in the private sector, public sector
employers nearly always operate on the “exclusive
representation” model, which is substantially more
straightforward
than
alternatives
such
as
bargaining with multiple employee representatives.
Only three states have even experimented with
proportional union representation, and two of
them—including California 8 —rapidly abandoned
that initiative.9 Martin H. Malin, Ann C. Hodges &
Joseph E. Slater, Public Sector Employment: Cases
and Materials 340 (2d ed. 2011).
Moreover, when acting as an exclusive
representative, a labor union has a duty to represent
all employees within the bargaining unit fairly.
Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202
(1944) (“It is a principle of general application that
the exercise of a granted power to act in behalf of
others involves the assumption toward them of a
duty to exercise the power in their interest and
behalf, and that such a grant of power will not be
Cal. Gov’t Code § 3540 (1976) (known as the Educational
Employment Relations Act). Petitioners argue that California
education unions can “choose between being a ‘members only’
union that advances only members’ interests, or an exclusive
representative that represents all employees.” Pet. Br. 38
(citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 3543.1(a)). That is incorrect, because
California law imposes a bargaining obligation “only with
representatives of employee organizations selected as exclusive
representatives” of bargaining units. Cal. Gov’t Code § 3543.3
(1976).
9 The third, Tennessee, adopted a system in 2011 that permits
any representative chosen by at least fifteen percent of teachers
to participate in “collaborative conferencing” with school
districts. Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-605 (2011).
8
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deemed to dispense with all duty toward those for
whom it is exercised unless so expressed.”); Lehnert
v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 556 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“Our First Amendment
jurisprudence therefore recognizes a correlation
between the rights and the duties of the union, on
the one hand, and the nonunion members of the
bargaining unit, on the other.”).
Given the union’s responsibilities, the
economic consequences of eliminating the agency
fee—the free rider problem—are easy to predict. In
short, even an employee who desires union
representation would rationally decide not to pay a
voluntary representation fee when the benefits of
union
representation—including
individualized
benefits like grievance representation—cannot be
withheld from non-payers. See Mancur Olson, The
Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the
Theory of Groups 88, 124 (1971) (“A rational worker
will not voluntarily contribute to a (large) union
providing a collective benefit since he alone would
not perceptibly strengthen the union, and since he
would get the benefits of any union achievements
whether or not he supported the union.”); Richard A.
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 430 (8th ed. 2011)
(“The representation election, the principle of
exclusive representation, and the union shop
together constitute an ingenious set of devices . . . for
overcoming the free-rider problems that would
otherwise plague the union . . . .”). This Court has
previously acknowledged this economic reality. See
Harris, 134 S.Ct. at 2638 (“[T]he best argument that
can be mounted in support of Abood is based on the
fact that a union, in serving as the exclusive
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representative of all the employees in a bargaining
unit, is required by law to engage in certain
activities that benefit nonmembers and that the
union would not undertake if it did not have a legal
obligation to do so.”); Abood, 431 U.S. at 221-22 (the
“union-shop arrangement has been thought to
distribute fairly the cost of these activities among
those who benefit, and it counteracts the incentive
that employees might otherwise have to become freeriders”) (internal quotation marks, citations, and
footnote omitted).
Research confirms the intuitive proposition
that when services are available with or without
payment, many will choose not to pay. 10 Keefe, A
Reconsideration & Empirical Evaluation, 34 Comp.
Lab. L. & Pol’y J. at 258 (“[p]ublic sector open shop
laws reduced average employee departmental
unionization by 4.0% for fire services, 10% for
highways, 12% for sanitation, and 15% for police”
and describing research finding “union density is
almost double where unions are allowed to negotiate
agency shop union security provisions, using CPS
data from 1983 to 2004.”); see also Jeffrey H. Keefe,
On Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association:
The
Inextricable
Links
Between
Exclusive
Representation, Agency Fees, and the Duty of Fair
Representation
(2015),
available
at
Petitioners’ “solution” that unions should “simply redirect the
massive amounts they . . . spend on express political advocacy”
in order to fulfill their statutory mandate to represent
nonmembers, Pet. Br. 31-32, raises its own First Amendment
concerns, “[f]or the majority also has an interest in stating its
views without being silenced by the dissenters.” Int’l Ass’n of
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 773 (1961).
10

24

http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/94942.pdf;
Barry
T.
Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union Membership
and Coverage Database from the Current Population
Survey, 56 Indus. & Labor Relations Rev. 349, 349–
54 (2003). Likewise, when Michigan recently
eliminated agency fees for union-represented public
sector workers, union membership fell in the state
even as the state’s public sector workforce grew. See
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Affiliation of Employed
Wage & Salary Workers By State, available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t05.htm; see
also Keefe, Inextricable Links at 2-3. Perhaps some
of these employees objected to union representation
altogether; others surely decided not to subsidize
their co-workers’ union representation—and instead
to be subsidized by others. But these losses
undermine states’ interests in equitable workforce
policies and risk sowing dissent in the workplace.
Abood, 431 U.S. at 221-22 (recognizing the state
interest in fairly distributing collective bargaining
costs); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring) (discussing need for public
employers to maintain workplace discipline, morale,
workplace harmony, and efficiency). This is not to
say that states may choose only bargaining
supported by agency fees—of course that is not the
case—but rather that states may now adopt or reject
agency fees (or serially experiment with both
models). Petitioners would remove that choice from
states.
2. Closely related, the representation with
which elected unions are tasked is expensive; an
under-resourced union will be less able to provide
the benefits of public sector bargaining and may also
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be unable to carry out its statutory duties. The
employer-side benefits of public sector collective
bargaining—such as providing a productive channel
for employee voice by both negotiating and enforcing
contracts via grievance proceedings, and working
collaboratively with management to solve workplace
problems—require trained union staff and other
resources. For example, competent bargaining over
even relatively straightforward wages and benefits
for a group of public employees at various stages of
their careers requires the services of compensation
consultants, actuaries, and lawyers. Even processing
a single grievance typically involves not just the
costs of paying the union/employee representative
who appears before the arbitrator, but also half of
the arbitrator’s fee and expenses. William B. Gould
IV, Kissing Cousins? The Federal Arbitration Act
and Modern Labor Arbitration, 55 Emory L.J. 609,
675 (2006).
As this Court has recognized, labor unrest
may result if dissatisfaction with an under-resourced
union leads employees to seek out a representative
that is better able to perform its duties. See Perry
Educ. Assoc. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assoc., 460
U.S. 37, 52 (1983) (the “exclusion of the rival union
may reasonably be considered a means of insuring
labor-peace” by preventing the employer from
“becoming a battlefield for inter-union squabbles”);
Abood, 431 U.S. at 224 (discussing the “confusion
and conflict that could arise if rival . . . unions,
holding quite different views as to [terms and
conditions of employment], each sought to obtain the
employer’s agreement”). Moreover, when unions are
at risk of losing funding from any employee
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dissatisfied with any aspect of the representation,
they may respond by concluding that they “must
process every grievance, placate every member, fight
for every little cause, in order to hold its
membership. The secure union, on the other hand,
can tell off a member just as well and sometimes
better than management can.” Md. Dep’t of Labor,
Licensing and Regulation, Collective Bargaining for
Maryland Public Employees: A Review of Policy
Issues and Options 19 (1996). This dynamic may (or
may not) be preferable to represented workers, but it
would undoubtedly make it more difficult for states
to achieve the benefits of collective bargaining
described above.
Thus, eliminating states’ choice to permit or
require an agency fee would not only leave states
vulnerable
to
intra-workforce
conflict
and
resentment as some workers free-ride on others, but
would also leave states less able to compete with the
private sector for the best workers and respond to
employee
dissatisfaction
through
collective
bargaining. Of course, the prospect of workplace
disruption poses special concerns for public
employers and administrators. It also presents a
certain irony—as discussed above, the avoidance of
labor disruption is one significant reason to allow
public employees to bargain collectively. Yet if states
lack the freedom to manage their employees by
bargaining with an elected union with the financial
means to robustly represent its members, they may
lose the very benefits that led them to authorize
collective bargaining in the first place.
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II. This
Court’s
Cases
Concerning
the
Managerial Rights of Public Employers
Have Repeatedly Affirmed That Abood
Struck the Appropriate First Amendment
Balance.
This Court has recognized in countless cases that
governments acting in their managerial capacity
have significantly more power to control workers’
speech than governments acting in their sovereign
capacities have over non-employee citizens. That
principle is especially forceful in the context of state
and local governments, where federalism also weighs
in favor of states’ managerial authority. See Kelley v.
Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976) (states’
managerial choices are entitled to “the same sort of
presumption of legislative validity as are state
choices designed to promote other aims within the
cognizance of the State's police power”). The outcome
in this case should be no different; indeed, it is the
petitioners in this case who seek an anomalous
departure from settled law.
Given their responsibilities over core
governmental functions, states and localities require
significant autonomy in workforce management. For
that reason, this Court has “often recognized that
government has significantly greater leeway in its
dealings with citizen employees than it does when it
brings its sovereign power to bear on citizens at
large.” Engquist v. Or. Dep’t. of Agric., 553 U.S. 591,
599 (2008); see also Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri,
131 S. Ct. 2488, 2497 (2011) (“The government's
interest in managing its internal affairs requires
proper restraints on the invocation of rights by
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employees when the workplace or the government
employer's responsibilities may be affected.”);
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994)
(plurality opinion) (“The government as employer
indeed has far broader powers than does the
government as sovereign.”); United Pub. Workers of
Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 101 (1947) (“For
regulation of employees it is not necessary that the
act regulated be anything more than an act
reasonably deemed by Congress to interfere with
the efficiency of the public service.”). Accordingly,
this Court has permitted public sector employers
much of the same discretion over human resources
management as enjoyed by the private sector. See
NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 152 (2011) (“Like any
employer, the Government is entitled to have its
projects staffed by reliable, law-abiding persons who
will efficiently and effectively discharge their
duties.” (internal quotations omitted)); Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (“[G]overnment
offices could not function if every employment
decision became a constitutional matter.”); U.S.
Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Assoc. of Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973) (holding Congress may bar
public employees from engaging in certain political
activity).
Managing public sector labor relations by
bargaining with an elected exclusive representative
that is financially supported by agency fees is no
different than the numerous other restrictions or
requirements that government employees must
accept. The balance struck in Abood recognized as
much in holding public employees could be required
to pay their share of union expenses related to
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collective bargaining—that is, expenses attributable
to the union’s dealing with the state in its capacity
as employer—but not other activities, including
those related to the union’s dealing with the state in
its capacity as sovereign. 431 U.S. at 235-36.
Subsequent cases, including Harris v. Quinn, have
only reinforced that principle. 134 S. Ct. at 2642
(“with respect to the [workers at issue], the State is
not acting in a traditional employer role”).
A. Abood is Consistent With This Court’s
Longstanding Principle That Public
Employers
May
Restrict
Public
Employees’ Speech to Promote the
Efficiency of Government Operations.
The distinction between government-asemployer and government-as-sovereign is critical in
the First Amendment context. “If an employee does
not speak as a citizen, or does not address a matter
of public concern, a federal court is not the
appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of
a personnel decision . . . . Even if an employee does
speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern, the
employee’s speech is not automatically privileged.”
Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2493 (internal quotations
omitted). “Restraints are justified by the consensual
nature of the employment relationship and by the
unique nature of the government’s interest.” Id. at
2493.
Accordingly, this Court has permitted
significant limits on public employees’ speech and
association, provided they are reasonably linked to
the government employer’s managerial interests.
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That principle explains why government may
prohibit public employees’ core political speech even
when they are off-duty. Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 99-100
(“If . . . efficiency may be best obtained by
prohibiting active participation by classified
employees in politics as party officers or workers, we
see no constitutional objection.”); see also Nat’l Ass’n
of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 565 (holding that
Hatch Act limits on public employees’ participation
in political campaigns are constitutional because
they “will reduce the hazards to fair and effective
government”). Mitchell and its progeny also
illustrate that this Court typically defers to
government employers’ determinations about what
employment policies will promote the efficient
provision of public services. 330 U.S. at 100
(government employer need not prove that political
neutrality is “indispensible”); see also Kelley, 425
U.S. at 247 (regulation of law enforcement personnel
is entitled to deference, unless “there is no rational
connection between the regulation, based as it is on
the county's method of organizing its police force,
and the promotion of safety of persons and
property”); Broadrick v. Okla., 413 U.S. 601, 697 n.5
(1973) (stating that “the legislature must have some
leeway” in implementing restrictions on employees’
partisan political activities).11
The dispositive significance of the government-as-employer’s
interests in maintaining organizational efficiency is further
illustrated by this Court’s decisions concerning the role of
political considerations in employment decisions. On one hand,
this Court has rejected political patronage systems for most
employees because the interests that support political
patronage for non-policymaking employees “are not interests
11
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This Court has applied the same principle in
countless other cases involving limits on public
employee speech, upholding limits that are
reasonably connected to the public employer’s
interests in managing its workforce, and rejecting
those that are not. E.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1988) (public school teacher
could not be punished for speaking as a citizen
where speech did not “impede[] the teacher’s
performance of his daily duties” . . . or “interfere[]
with the regular operation of the schools generally”);
United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union,
513 U.S. 454, 465 (1995) (prohibition on
compensation for public employees’ outside speeches
or writing is unconstitutional where employees’
speech occurred in “their capacity as citizens,” and
“does not even arguably have any adverse impact on
the efficiency of the offices in which they work”);
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (“A
government entity has broader discretion to restrict
speech when it acts in its role as employer, but the
restrictions it imposes must be directed at speech
that has some potential to affect the entity's
operations.”); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378,
388 (1987) (“[T]he state interest element of the
[Pickering] test focuses on the effective functioning
that the government has in its capacity as an employer.” Rutan
v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 70 n.4 & 75 (1990).
However, the Court also noted that patronage may be
permissible where “‘party affiliation is an appropriate
requirement for the effective performance of the public office
involved.’” Id. at 71 n.5 (quoting Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507,
518 (1980)). It is the presence of legitimate managerial
concerns that makes the difference to the First Amendment
outcome.
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of the public employer’s enterprise.”). Harris v.
Quinn is simply the latest iteration of this principle;
there, this Court’s holding rested largely on its
conclusion that Illinois did not employ the personal
assistants who opposed payment of a mandatory
agency fee, 134 S.Ct. at 2638, and therefore by
definition was not entitled to the deference usually
afforded to public employers.
Thus, a key inquiry in this case is whether
California’s adoption of collective bargaining
supported by an agency fee is reasonably related to
its interest in managing its workforce. And, as the
previous section illustrates, states adopt systems of
collective bargaining with elected unions that may
charge agency fees for the management-related goals
of improving operational efficiency and minimizing
workforce conflict and disruption. Likewise, when an
elected union sits across the bargaining table from a
public employer or pursues a grievance, it acts as an
agent for one or more public employees regarding
their terms and conditions of employment in a
manner that quintessentially involves governmentas-employer rather than government-as-sovereign.
This is perhaps most readily apparent in the context
of grievance proceedings where a union argues on
behalf of a single employee that a single contract
term has been misapplied. See Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct.
at 2496 (allowing close First Amendment scrutiny of
“grievances on a variety of employment matters” . . .
“would raise serious federalism and separation-ofpowers concerns”). But negotiation over terms and
conditions of employment for a bargaining unit as a
whole is no different. As Justice Scalia pointed out
during oral argument in Harris v. Quinn, there is no
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meaningful difference between an individual public
employee asking for a raise on behalf of all public
employees (perhaps because the employee is aware
that civil service protections limit the authority of
the employer to give a single employee a raise) and a
union seeking a raise on behalf of all employees in a
bargaining unit. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8
(No. 11-681) (“it’s the same grievance if the union
had presented it . . . the grievance is the salaries for
policemen are not high enough.”). Moreover, many
collectively bargained terms and conditions of
employment concern prosaic issues that may be of
significant importance to public employees, but are
of little public importance. For example, petitioners
cite “seniority preferences” as a “hotly debated”
policy issue about which some unions bargain, Pet.
Br. at 26, but this Court has already held that
internal decisions about when or how to transfer
public employees are generally not a matter of public
concern. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148.12 In all of those

Likewise, the application of contract terms in individual
cases in which unions represent an employee in a grievance
proceeding would be exceedingly unlikely to raise an issue of
public concern. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2501 (public employees
may not “transform everyday employment disputes into
matters for constitutional litigation in the federal courts”); see
also William B. Gould IV, Organized Labor, The Supreme
Court, & Harris v. Quinn: Déjà vu All Over Again?, 2014 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 133, 158-59. And even as to wages and benefits, the
effect of collective bargaining on the size of public budgets is
often small, supra Part I.A.4, and therefore should not
implicate the Harris majority’s concern about the effects of
collective bargaining on overall program budgets. Cf. Harris,
134 S. Ct. at 2642-43 (reasoning that collective bargaining over
Medicaid-funded home healthcare providers would qualify as a
12
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examples, the government acts as an employer
managing its employees; accordingly, deference to
states’ managerial choices about when—and under
what terms—collective bargaining supported by an
agency fee should be permitted is appropriate under
this Court’s case law.
Finally, the distinction between government’s
roles as public employer and as sovereign (and the
mirror-image distinction between individuals’ roles
as employees and citizens) also explains why this
Court should reject petitioners’ argument that
collective bargaining is essentially the same as
lobbying, Pet. Br. at 12. The key difference is that
bargaining takes place with a government in its
employer capacity, but lobbying involves a
government in its capacity as sovereign. Compare
Minn. St. Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465
U.S. 271, 285 (1984) (public employer may bargain
with exclusive representative only, and exclude all
others, because bargaining did not take place in
public forum and “[n]othing in the First Amendment
. . . require[s] government policymakers to listen or
respond to individuals’ communications on public
issues”), with City of Madison, Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8
v. Wisc. Empl. Rel. Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976)
(public employer may not prohibit union-represented
teachers from engaging in speech contrary to union
position in public forum). 13 This distinction also
matter of public concern because it “would almost certainly
mean increased expenditures under the Medicaid program”).
13 As City of Madison illustrates, represented workers remain
free to oppose their bargaining representative by any available
means and in any forum to which they can gain access; indeed,
the average union wage premium leaves represented workers
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explains why states may prohibit public sector
collective bargaining altogether without facing First
Amendment scrutiny. Smith v. Ark. State Highway
Emp., 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979) (“the First
Amendment is not a substitute for the national labor
relations laws”). In contrast, it goes nearly without
saying that the same could not be said of a statute
that banned lobbying. See U.S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S.
612 (1954); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
558 U.S. 310, 369 (2010) (“Congress has no power to
ban lobbying itself.”).
B.

Overruling Abood Would Call Into
Question the Legality of Many Other
Common Public Human Resources
Practices.

If this Court holds that public employees have
a right not to fund union activities related to
collective bargaining, many other common workplace
arrangements will also be called into question. For
example, many state pension funds are managed by
and invested in private companies; the corporations
in which public pension plans invest may engage in
political speech, raising Abood-type issues. See
Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and
Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United, 112
Colum. L. Rev. 800, 867-68 (2012). Similar claims
with more resources with which to oppose union positions in
public fora or lobby for revocation of public sector bargaining
statutes. Thus, the restriction on public employees in this case
is much less than Mitchell’s complete ban on certain political
activity, or the party affiliation requirements that the Court
suggested in Rutan and Branti would be permissible for policymaking employees.
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could be made regarding state payments to human
resources consultants, employment lawyers, and
dispute resolution experts who are paid by the state
to manage the workplace. See Cynthia Estlund, Are
Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 Mich. L. Rev.
169, 171 (2015) (describing “a larger category of
private entities with public regulatory functions”).
These routine public workplace policies should not
become subject to First Amendment challenges.
This Court should not overrule Abood, but
should instead reaffirm that states are free to
manage their workforces by adopting a policy of
public sector bargaining supported by an agency fee.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Ninth Circuit should be affirmed.
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